A CALL TO ACTION
LOS ANGELES’ QUEST TO ACHIEVE COMMUNITY SAFETY
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT is a public policy change organization rooted in the civil rights movement. We engineer large-scale systems change to remedy inequality, expand opportunity and open paths to upward mobility. Our goal is that members of all communities have the safety, opportunity and health they need to thrive.

Our signature is reach and impact. With our strong ties to diverse communities, unlikely alliances, policy and legal expertise, and creative use of technology, we and our partners have won over $15 billion to extend opportunity. Whether it is to build 150 schools, transform the City of Los Angeles’ approach to its gang epidemic, or revolutionize the use of data in policymaking, Advancement Project evens the odds for communities striving to attain equal footing and equal treatment.

The URBAN PEACE PROGRAM at Advancement Project reduces and prevents community violence, making poor neighborhoods safer so that children can learn, families can thrive and communities can prosper. A new approach to preventing community violence, Urban Peace applies public health methods to understand the underlying reasons for violence and creates innovative, holistic ways to change the conditions that lead to them.
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Los Angeles needed to replace an endless “shock and awe” war with a community safety model based on a comprehensive public health approach that melded strategic suppression, prevention, intervention and community mobilization.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 17, 2007, the Advancement Project Urban Peace program released the groundbreaking report, *A Call to Action: A Case for a Comprehensive Solution to L.A.’s Gang Violence Epidemic (A Call to Action)*. A Call to Action explained why Los Angeles’ 30-year “war on gangs” had failed to quell either gangs or gang violence.

**SIX TIMES AS MANY GANGS & TWICE AS MANY GANG MEMBERS**

Based on exhaustive research by 45 subject matter experts, including law enforcement, *A Call to Action* documented that after spending $25 billion dollars on a 30-year “war on gangs”, the County of Los Angeles had six times as many gangs, increasing gang violence, and gang participation that had mushroomed to more than 100,000 active members.

This massive failure could be seen as a warning that we needed a completely new strategy. The report concluded that Los Angeles needed to replace this endless “shock and awe” war with a community safety model based on a comprehensive public health approach that melded strategic suppression, prevention, intervention and community mobilization.

Instead of mainly re-arresting the same gang members, the City and County also needed robust efforts designed to keep the 850,000 children trapped in Los Angeles County’s gang zones safe. As then Los Angeles Police Department Chief of Police William Bratton said, “We cannot arrest our way out of the gang crisis. We need to do the full agenda laid out in *A Call to Action.*”

Since the tremendous media frenzy in the wake of the 2007 release of *A Call to Action*, Los Angeles has been on an unprecedented quest – an extraordinary experiment to find out what it takes to keep children safe in the worst gang zones. This report is a look back at the five years of work propelled by *A Call to Action*; a check on the progress L.A. has made; and presents a vision for building on current gains to achieve the final stages of comprehensive public safety in the places where children still suffer chronic exposure to trauma and violence.
THE TURNING POINT

With over 100 recommendations, A Call to Action revolutionized Los Angeles City’s struggle with gang violence. The Los Angeles Times hailed the report as “A Marshall Plan for L.A. Gangs”; local papers kept the report in the headlines for several weeks; and dozens of television crews sought interviews with its authors. The report hit a nerve: It arrived during a time when end-of-year gang crime statistics appeared, showing gangs spreading to previously gang-free middle class enclaves like the San Fernando Valley, which suffered a 43% increase in gang crime in 2006.

The report also showcased, for the first time, an army of unlikely allies of police officials, prosecutors, and department heads joining with community advocates, gang interventionists, educators, and medical and public health professionals—all standing behind one vision and calling for large scale change. LAPD Chief William Bratton stated that A Call to Action “changed how the City of Los Angeles dealt with its gang crisis – much for the better,” and City Controller Laura Chick noted, “If not for that report, we’d still be banging our heads against a wall and repeating the same failures every year.”

FIVE YEARS LATER

Five years later, in 2011, the City has a surprisingly successful story to tell about gang violence reduction, with gang-related crime reduced by over 15% and 35% fewer gang-related homicides in neighborhoods served by the Mayor’s Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development’s (GRYD) summer violence reduction strategy, Summer Night Lights. This turnaround began with A Call to Action: A Case for a Comprehensive Solution to L.A.’s Gang Epidemic, spearheaded by Urban Peace and its allies.

FROM WAR TO COLLABORATION: THE JOURNEY TO A NEW VIOLENCE REDUCTION MODEL

A Call to Action called for a revolutionary change from the City and all its violence reduction stakeholders, pushing for the adoption of a community-driven, asset-based public health approach to violence—a comprehensive gang violence reduction model. Before A Call to Action, Los Angeles’ police repeatedly arrested the same gang members in a wasteful “war on gangs”, and public sector agencies and private funders pursued a fruitless, ad-hoc approach to gangs that may have had individual program level success, but lacked impact on the overall scale of the problem. Many were doing good work that benefitted individuals, but nothing that could dent the culture or scope of the gang violence. Many of these efforts also focused on individual at-risk youth, and sometimes their families, but did not address the underlying conditions in the communities where they struggled to survive and in which succeeding generations were inculcated in gang culture.

"IF WE HAD BEEN DOING WHAT THIS REPORT RECOMMENDS FOR THE PAST 30 YEARS, WE WOULDN’T BE FACING THE GANG CRISIS WE HAVE."

–STEVE COOLEY
District Attorney

*Bolded items in this report are defined in the glossary on page 56.
Accordingly, the subsequent work of Urban Peace’s program centered on creating innovative ways to apply what we coined the *Comprehensive Violence Reduction Strategy* (CVRS). There are a number of violence reduction models applied across the country, each addressing disparate community violence factors. These violence reduction models have resulted in crime reductions and, in some instances, safer communities. Notwithstanding the success of these other approaches, we believe the CVRS presents the most exhaustive and holistic framework.

Understanding that violence is a symptom of deeper conditions, the CVRS focuses on addressing the 10 root conditions of violence through five service elements: prevention, intervention, suppression, reentry, and the equitable distribution of resources. Moreover, the CVRS strategy operates under three guiding principles: community-based and culturally competent service delivery, data-driven policy making, and built-in accountability. Unique to our strategy is the recognized need for not just violence reduction, but for sustainable, long-term paths to community transformation and health.

**Within this framework, and with the goal of ensuring that A Call to Action’s recommendations were fully implemented, Urban Peace took on several roles:**

1. Advocating for the implementation of the recommendations within the City and the Los Angeles Police Department.
2. Building the capacity of all stakeholders to understand and execute the holistic, wrap-around strategy required by the CVRS.
3. Providing training and tools for stakeholders, including the curriculum for the City’s Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA), which serves law enforcement and gang interventionists.
4. Convening stakeholders in different forums to ensure that the CVRS is broadly and deeply understood and that diverse, interested groups work toward the same goals.
5. Building multi-jurisdictional collaboration to broaden the impact of the CVRS.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The public health, wrap-around Comprehensive Violence Reduction Strategy (CVRS) has driven many of Los Angeles’ achievements over the last five years; achievements that are the result of aggressive cooperation among disparate sectors and organizations.

These achievements include:

- The Los Angeles City Council focused prevention and intervention funding in violence hot zones, as opposed to dividing funds evenly among all 15 council districts, as had been the norm.

- The Los Angeles Police Department has transformed and continues to refine the way it deals with gangs, from a counter-productive, overbroad suppression approach to relationship-based, problem-solving policing showcased in the five year Community Safety Partnership project.

- The City of Los Angeles experienced dramatic reductions in crime and its lowest rate since the 1960s.

- The Urban Peace Academy launched, establishing the only rigorous training program for gang interventionists in the country that sets professional standards for the dangerous work of gang intervention.

- Urban Peace conducted drill-down community violence assessments in 19 communities, engaging over 5,000 individuals living and working in violence hot zones.

- The Urban Peace Academy trained over 1,200 gang interventionists and over 400 police officers to work together towards violence reduction.

- The Belmont Neighborhood Violence Reduction Collaborative launched, implementing the CVRS in a community focused on school safety.

- Urban Peace developed the City of Los Angeles Community Safety Scorecard that provides a ZIP code level analysis of safety, assigning a letter grade from A to F on a complex set of safety, school conditions, risk and protective factors in a community.

- Urban Peace released A Framework for Implementing the CVRS in your Neighborhood which provides concrete tools for communities, the public sector, and service providers to work together toward community safety.

- Urban Peace partnered with the Los Angeles County Probation Department to ensure that the 20,000 youth in their charge are no longer abused or neglected.
The City of Los Angeles established **THE MAYOR’S OFFICE OF GANG REDUCTION & YOUTH DEVELOPMENT OFFICE (GRYD)** that created GRYD zones throughout the City in communities with the highest levels of violence. The GRYD office developed a family-centered conceptual model which includes 16 strategy approaches; the model informs all of GRYD’s practices, including the Summer Night Lights (SNL) Program. The GRYD milestones included below resulted from its implementation of this conceptual model:

**SECONDARY PREVENTION MULTI-GENERATIONAL FAMILY CENTERED PROGRAMS:**
- 49.7% of current participants have reduced risk factors and negative behaviors below threshold levels.
- 23% of participants have decreased antisocial behavior.
- 29% decrease in lack of parental supervision among participants.
- 47.3% decrease in gang fights involving participants.
- 48% decrease in participant involvement in gang activities.

**COMMUNITY & LAW ENFORCEMENT ENGAGEMENT:**
- Assaults with a deadly weapon against law enforcement in GRYD zones have declined by 48% vs. 9% outside of GRYD zones.

**INTERVENTION CRISIS RESPONSE:**
- Since April 2011, GRYD staff, along with gang intervention workers and law enforcement, have responded to 2,386 incidents of violence inside and outside of GRYD zones.
- GRYD zones have experienced a 29.8% reduction in gang-related crime and a 42.4% reduction in shots fired.
- Homicides in GRYD zones have decreased by 50% more than reductions in the rest of the City.

**SUMMER NIGHT LIGHTS (SNL):**
- Between 2008-2011 there were approximately 1,804,800 visits made to the SNL parks.
- More than 1,137,424 meals have been served.
- Approximately 3,500 jobs were offered to at-risk individuals.

**WHY L.A. IS SUCCEEDING**

This unlikely, yet successful experiment has worked for several key reasons. First, local elected officials had the courage to take risks and reform “business as a usual”. For example, in order to carry out the “hot zone gang strategy”, the City Council agreed to take resources and funds from districts with relatively low gang crime and redeploy them to districts with high gang crime – the gang “hot zones”. These resources were sustained despite the fiscal crisis in the City and were augmented by innovative public-private partnerships with philanthropy and business.

The problem-solving and mission-oriented mentality of elected leaders, law enforcement, other public sector, and community groups removed the normal focus on narrow interests and paved the way for the larger violence reduction strategy.

The creation of the GRYD office and the reform that has taken place within the Los Angeles Police Department, as well as the expansion of gang intervention workers’ skills, have created a platform for cross-sector, multi-disciplinary collaboration and shared accountability to achieve public safety.

Neighborhood and data-driven strategies are lifting up the knowledge and leadership in communities and beginning to create community capacity to build and sustain safety solutions.
Despite amazing gains in violence reduction for the City of Los Angeles as a whole, there is still much left to do. We are not yet fully cured of this complex epidemic – the conditions that spawn and sustain gang violence remain largely unchanged in L.A.’s most vulnerable communities. We continue to require holistic, systemic, and politically difficult solutions. We must continue working to ensure that the CVRS is implemented at its full scale.

To meet the scale and scope of the need:

- Continue to hold government accountable for providing basic safety for every child.
- All sectors must fully embrace a problem-solving approach.
- All stakeholders must act with the mission-outlook – without zeal and commitment shown by community advocates and LAPD the work will not succeed.
- All sectors must work toward eliminating the root conditions in communities that perpetuate violence and short change children’s futures.
- The public sector must use public funds for community revitalization strategies.
- Key stakeholders must engage in meaningful, trustworthy collaboration: top-down, bottom-up, and side-to-side.
- A creative, nimble, entrepreneurial approach – employed by some City departments like GRYD – must be taken up by all departments that deal with issues of community violence and youth development.
- Investment in prevention, intervention, and reentry efforts must be scaled-up to meet the size of the need.
- Schools must become wrap-around community centers at the heart of community safety solutions.
- Law enforcement reform must persist with a continued focus on implementing strategic – not overbroad – suppression.
- Seize the opportunity presented by realignment to reform the California criminal justice system by permanently shifting away from mass incarceration and by developing a rehabilitative structure for those returning from incarceration.
- Given the racial diversity and demographic shifts in Los Angeles, initiatives aimed at solving protracted issues must observe the need for high multiracial and interracial understanding in order to deliver culturally competent services that truly address the problem.

All programs and initiatives must continue to employ interracially sophisticated and savvy leaders who embrace skilled assessments; use multi-disciplinary best practices; and enact evaluation-driven policies. We must not let our success in crime reduction thus far diminish the urgency of the continued need for further reductions in violence and in the culture of gangs in our communities.

As the mayoral election looms in 2013, a key question facing the City is whether the new mayor will visibly demonstrate his/her backing for a comprehensive public safety approach, garnering strategic partners from the private and the public sectors. This will be proven by making GRYD a permanent, independent institution that is adequately resourced and with the political strength to tackle community conditions and supporting LAPD’s continued transformation under its current leadership.

Ending the public safety inequity that renders gang violence hot zone communities invisible to the rest of Los Angeles means we must provide youth greater alternatives that preempt gang joining. Political will is necessary to pull together a truly comprehensive solution with real government-community partnerships at both the City and County level, tailored to yield and sustain results for each individual neighborhood.

Los Angeles cannot rest until every family and every child enjoy the first of all civil rights – safety – and the first of all freedoms – freedom from violence.

**TIME FOR A NEW CALL TO ACTION**

Poverty: 266,868 children living in poverty
Community Violence: 373,082 children living in violent crime areas
Domestic Violence: 43,623 children with abuse allegations
Lack of School Attachment: 34,960 LAUSD suspensions
It was Urban Peace’s innovative approach that lifted A Call to Action from mere report to catalytic document that translated directly into political action.
WE’VE COME SO FAR


TRANSFORMING WORDS INTO ACTION

Urban Peace and its allies succeeded where prior reports have failed by making sure words on a page were transformed into political action. It was Urban Peace’s innovative approach that lifted *A Call to Action* from mere report to catalytic document that translated directly into political action.

First, the report executed an “inside-outside” strategy – incorporating input and participation from both public sector “insiders” as well as “outside” advocates. In this way, the solutions proposed by the report were embraced by those living in the high violence communities as well as the elected officials responsible for executing the strategy.

Second, we understood that this crisis needed an exceptional leader within the City to carry out the report’s recommendations, i.e. a “Gang Czar”. Calling on the expertise of City Hall insiders, Urban Peace developed a politically feasible accountability structure to ensure recommended changes were carried out – this transformed into the Mayor’s Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD).

Forging this broad, multi-sector consensus was crucial to translating the report’s recommendations into on-the-ground policy change.

Finally, throughout the process, Urban Peace actively engaged with key leaders in law enforcement, academic researchers, community-based providers, gang intervention practitioners, and City and County departments to ensure their individual commitments to the report upon its release. Forging this broad, multi-sector consensus was crucial to translating the reports’ recommendations into on-the-ground policy change.
While A Call to Action became known as “The Gang Report,” the fact remains that it was not about gangs. Gangs are only a very visible symptom of structural, entrenched community conditions that allow a cult of death to flourish and that prevent children and youth from learning, families from thriving, and communities from prospering.

In order to sustainably reduce violence, A Call to Action demanded a strategy that did not just focus on gangs, but instead targets the underlying conditions that fuel and sustain violence. Many of the report’s recommendations called on the City to invest in prevention and intervention resources. The ultimate goal was a long-term, wrap-around solution in neighborhoods with the highest concentration of violence.

The report made clear, and law enforcement leaders agreed, that violence was not the sole purview of law enforcement. While targeted suppression activities were necessary, law enforcement also needed to coordinate with prevention and intervention providers.

A Call to Action focused on schools as the center of violence prevention activities, opening early and staying open late for enrichment activities, engaging parents, and providing highly coordinated early intervention for the children most likely to become victims or perpetrators of violence.

Law enforcement, the City, the County, and L.A. school districts were called upon to partner with communities, to leverage their resources, and to constantly collaborate on a unified campaign to reverse the culture of violence and destruction that had become the norm in gang impacted neighborhoods.

The release of the report drew more than 1,000 people to City Hall with civic, faith, and law enforcement leaders, as well as community members directly impacted by violence, demanding that the report’s recommendations be put on a fast track for implementation. Hundreds of local and national media outlets covered the report’s hearing, including the Los Angeles Times which dubbed the report a “Marshall Plan to reduce gang violence.”

Despite public and media support, the game-changing consensus we sought was not immediately forthcoming. In the weeks after its release, there was a flurry of action from various levels of government, the majority of which squarely fell in the realm of overbroad suppression – the exact opposite of the comprehensive solution articulated in the report.

Over time that changed. Urban Peace and its army of allies continued to push the report’s vision of wrap-around services, a law enforcement-civic partnership, cross-sector collaboration, and an inside-outside political strategy. Law enforcement leaders like Chief William Bratton, Chief Charles Beck, and Sheriff Leroy Baca repeatedly demonstrated unwavering support. Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa boldly – and against expectations – established the Mayor’s Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development built upon the core principles articulated in the report. Controller Laura Chick’s 2008 follow-up report largely affirmed the findings of A Call to Action.

Buttressed by this critical partner support, Urban Peace kept pushing the City and the County to create A Call to Action’s wrap-around public safety strategy and to build the strength of the nascent GRYD office.

**GANG VIOLENCE AS SYMPTOM OF A LARGER DISEASE**

“THE LARGER POLITICAL CONSENSUS IS THAT NEIGHBORHOODS HIDDEN BEHIND THE VEIL OF POVERTY WILL REMAIN DANGEROUS, OPPORTUNITY-LESS AND PERPETUALLY POOR. WE, ‘THE FOLKS WHO COUNT,’ DO NOT ENVISION EVER INCLUDING INVISIBLE LOS ANGELES IN THE PROSPERITY EQUATION.”

—CONNIE RICE
Co-Director, Advancement Project

**THE RECEPTION OF A CALL TO ACTION**
VIOLENT CRIME DECREASED IN MOST AREAS OF LOS ANGELES BETWEEN 2007 AND 2011

Change in Violent Crime* by ZIP Code, between 2007 and 2011

ZIP Codes with Increases in Violent Crime*

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<th>ZIP Code</th>
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ZIP Codes with Decreases in Violent Crime*

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<th>ZIP Code</th>
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<tr>
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Since the release of the report, L.A. has experienced a remarkable drop in crime, reporting low crime rates not seen since the 1960s. In 2010, the number of homicides in L.A. fell below 300 for the first time since the early 1990s when the City experienced more than 1,000 homicides annually. While California has seen crime rate reductions statewide, Los Angeles’ most dramatic decreases have occurred where A Call to Action’s comprehensive strategy has been put into place: GRYD zones.

As the following charts illustrate, the strategy to bring prevention, intervention and community policing together, nowhere better implemented than in the Mayor’s Summer Night Lights park program, demonstrate that a comprehensive, community-based approach can have a dramatic impact on gang-related crime.
We have also achieved a decided shift in the public discourse on violence and gangs; they now include the comprehensive strategy that was advocated in the report. For Los Angeles City the strategy has gone from a heavy-handed war on gangs to a comprehensive, holistic strategy. There is recognition of the need to prevent youth from joining gangs by offering real alternatives and pathways to opportunity.

In L.A., we now speak of community safety as more than just a numerical decrease in crime statistics. Instead, we talk about safety in terms of whether children are being traumatized on their way to school. We talk about strengthening families so that they can replace gangs as the primary support structure for our high risk youth. Finally, gang interventionists and law enforcement, unlikely allies who in 2007 would not sit at the same table, now work together and routinely credit each other for the peace on our streets.

**SCALE, SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF LOS ANGELES GANG PROBLEM CONTINUES TO REQUIRE COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSES**

We rightfully celebrate the past five years’ remarkable achievements and applaud the efforts of law enforcement, the GRYD office, and of elected and community leaders. At the same time, we remain mindful that the conditions that spawn and sustain gangs and the violence that prompted A Call to Action remain largely unchanged in the City’s most vulnerable communities. Moreover, new threats in the form of cartels and other international organized crime are about to make this terrain more treacherous.

We have laid many important pieces of the foundation for long-term violence reduction, yet much work remains to be done. To permanently reverse the violence-spawning conditions in Los Angeles’ violence hot zones and to completely reverse gang culture, we must stay the course and simultaneously increase investment to meet the scale of the problem.
INDISPENSABLE ADVOCATES & COMMUNITY PARTNERS

The success of the last five years could never have been achieved without the organized efforts of many partners. It has taken a tremendous amount of neighborhood by neighborhood collaboration to advance the mission of comprehensive violence reduction.

The efforts and commitment of the following individuals and agencies have undoubtedly contributed to Los Angeles’ remarkable progress. It is with the following partners that we celebrate the success achieved thus far and with whom we will continue to collaborate:

ANTONIO VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor of the City of Los Angeles

CHARLES L. BECK
Los Angeles Police Chief

LEROY D. BACA
Los Angeles County Sheriff

WILLIAM T. BRATTON
Former Los Angeles Police Chief

LOS ANGELES CITY COUNCILMEMBERS and, in particular TONY CARDENAS
as the Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development

LAURA CHICK, Former LA City Controller and WENDY GREUEL, Current Controller

BILL FUJIOKA
CEO of the County of Los Angeles

GUILLERMO CESPEDES, Los Angeles Deputy Mayor

and all our partners at THE MAYOR’S OFFICE OF GANG REDUCTION AND YOUTH DEVELOPMENT (GRYD)

THE URBAN PEACE ACADEMY AND ALL PARTNERS
as well as the Professional Standards Committee, Executive Advisory Committee, Advisory Council, Curriculum Development Workgroup, and all instructors

LOS ANGELES CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

ALL VIOLENCE REDUCTION AND PREVENTION AGENCIES ACROSS LOS ANGELES COUNTY

GANG INTERVENTION AGENCIES ACROSS LOS ANGELES COUNTY

LOS ANGELES VICTIM SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS

This work also could not have been possible without the steadfast and courageous investment by the philanthropic community. The following have been indispensable partners:

THE ANNENBERG FOUNDATION

THE BANK OF AMERICA CHARITABLE FOUNDATION

THE CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY FOUNDATION

THE CALIFORNIA ENDOWMENT

THE CALIFORNIA WELLNESS FOUNDATION

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY FOUNDATION

THE RALPH M. PARSONS FOUNDATION

THE ROSE HILLS FOUNDATION

THE WEINGART FOUNDATION

THE W.M. KECK FOUNDATION
In the year before the release of *A Call to Action: The Case for a Comprehensive Solution to Los Angeles’ Gang Violence Epidemic*, there were 7,436 gang crime incidents in the City of Los Angeles.

As shown in the map on the left, the southern and eastern portions of the City experienced concentrated gang violence.

While the ZIP codes with the most gang-related crime incidents in 2006 continue to have high levels of gang-related crime incidents in 2011, these areas have experienced a significant reduction in gang-related crime over the last five years.

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**Total Gang-Related Crime Incidents**

7,436

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**ZIP codes with the most gang-related crime incidents, 2006**

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*Gang-related crime incidents reflect all incidents reported to the LAPD, including incidents outside of Los Angeles City boundaries.

The number of gang-related crime incidents per ZIP code reflects the incidents reported only to the LAPD. The actual number of incidents may be higher for each ZIP code when including incidents reported by other agencies.

Geographic data from Esri, NAVTEQ, DeLorme, Census TIGER cartographic boundary files. Crime data from Los Angeles Police Department. Gang-related incidents do not include reported incidents related to domestic violence, sex crime, suicide, or child abuse.
Five years later, the southern and eastern portions of the City continue to experience the majority of gang-related incidents; however, the number of gang-related crime incidents has decreased throughout the City. Targeted investment in the ZIP codes with the highest number of gang-related incidents has begun to produce positive results. Continued long-term investment is still needed to truly transform these communities.

CHANGE IN TOP TEN ZIP CODES FOR GANG-RELATED CRIME\(^a\), 2006 AND 2011

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\(^a\) City of Los Angeles Zip Code Boundaries

ZIP codes with the most gang-related crime incidents, 2011

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\(^*\) Indicates a change in the top ten ranking from 2006 to 2011.
"The dialogue about HOW community transformation should take place has changed."

Monica Jackson,
Executive Director, New Directions for Youth, Inc.
In the 2007 *A Call to Action* report, Urban Peace outlined a vision for a comprehensive violence reduction strategy. That vision has guided the work of Urban Peace and has informed the strategies of government, community and law enforcement partners, who have each crafted their own conceptual models to guide their specific violence reduction efforts. Most notably, the Mayor’s Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) has developed a family-centered, conceptual model that guides all of its programs and practices and has produced many successes.18

Our reference to the “Los Angeles Model” is an attempt to begin to bring together the many distinct but inter-related and complementary strands of violence reduction work that have emerged since the original *A Call to Action*. It is neither an exhaustive, nor a complete catalogue of all violence reduction work happening in Los Angeles. Undoubtedly, a dialogue to more clearly define the “L.A. model” should and will continue with all involved stakeholders and practitioners. To begin that larger conversation, this section puts forth Urban Peace’s understanding of the emerging and evolving “L.A. Model.”

Los Angeles’ unique approach to violence reduction joins several other models in practice throughout the country. In fact, the current violence reduction experiment in L.A. can find its roots in the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) Gang Reduction Program (GRP) that was piloted in the Boyle Heights neighborhood in 2005, itself based on the Spergel model of comprehensive violence reduction. The Spergel model and the GRP identified some of the basic elements of a comprehensive model, but with varying implementation and results across the pilot sites. As a result, neither has articulated, at the practice level, what is meant by covering the spectrum of primary prevention, secondary prevention, intervention, reentry and coordination with law enforcement.19

Other implemented models include Chicago Ceasefire and the Boston Operation Ceasefire as well as its next iteration, Network for Safe Communities.20 These models each emphasize a different element of violence reduction. Chicago Ceasefire focuses on intervention to interrupt the cycle of violence, and Network for Safe Communities focuses on enforcement activities vis a vis the most violent perpetrators. While both of these models have produced positive results and important lessons learned through evaluation, neither is comprehensive.

What distinguishes the L.A. model from others is that it incorporates comprehensive principles like the Spergel Model, yet it has gone beyond the conceptual stage to actual implementation, resulting in concrete standards for implementing each component of a comprehensive strategy. As noted, a big portion of this accomplishment stems from the GRYD conceptual model that guides the work of the community-based agencies contracted by the City to implement the targeted prevention and intervention programs in the GRYD zones.

Moreover, beyond the work of GRYD, Urban Peace’s Comprehensive Violence Reduction Strategy (CVRS) has also produced concrete practice standards for building a community-driven, stakeholder network for safety, gang intervention, law enforcement, and school safety. This advance is unique to L.A. and is the result of three inter-related contexts in which the model has evolved over the past five years.

First and foremost, the scale, scope, and intensity of gang entrenchment in some of L.A.’s communities require a comprehensive response that may not be required in other places with fewer gangs, smaller geography, or less entrenched gang dominance, particularly in regards to the influence exercised by prison gangs on street dynamics.

Second, political scrutiny stemming from the media pressure and public debate generated by *A Call to Action* created an imperative for the Mayor’s Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development to begin implementation almost immediately and to achieve results.

Finally, the steadfast backing from the Mayor, the Chief of Police, and other elected, civic, and philanthropic leaders meant that the resources garnered and deployed to the violence hot zones, although still not to scale, were maintained over the past five years.
Mayors Office of Gang Reduction & Youth Development Has Been Key to Success

Propelled by these dynamics, L.A. needed to spell out how a comprehensive violence reduction strategy is practiced. Much credit goes to the Mayor’s Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GYRD) that grappled with the difficult issues of translating a conceptual model into actual practice in the community. Some of the issues GRYD has confronted and answered include:

- How to identify youth with the highest risk for joining a gang
- Prevention protocol to keep highest risk youth from joining gangs in the first place
- The most important elements of self-differentiation that allow youth to embrace alternatives to gang membership
- The critical steps of coordination between law enforcement and gang intervention in the first 24 hours after a shooting
- How to mobilize a community around a safe public space to begin to reverse the normalization of violence, (e.g. the Summer Night Lights park program).

Through its targeted prevention, crisis response protocol, Summer Night Lights program, and other elements of the GRYD strategy, the Mayor’s office has created a concrete guide to operationalizing important service elements of a comprehensive strategy.

Moreover, through the establishment of the Los Angeles Gang Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA), run by the Urban Peace Academy,21 L.A. has solidified the standards of practice and professionalism for gang interventionists, bringing these practitioners into the comprehensive strategy as legitimate partners to community and school leaders, police, and other stakeholders. At the frontline of gang dynamics and violence, gang intervention workers have been key to de-escalating tension and reducing retaliatory shootings, as well as ensuring the success of safe public spaces strategies such as Summer Night Lights.
THE COMPREHENSIVE VIOLENCE REDUCTION STRATEGY (CVRS)

The Urban Peace program has continued to refine the public health approach to violence reduction first articulated in A Call to Action. Building upon that research and primary data gathered from our engagement with 19 communities since 2006, we have developed a model for gang entrenched communities – the Comprehensive Violence Reduction Strategy (CVRS).

The CVRS is an asset-based, public health approach to violence that links all the elements of violence reduction with community development, cultural transformation, multi-jurisdictional coordination, and accountability. Urban Peace’s theory of change asserts that sustainable violence reduction happens when community and government work together under a single, data-driven strategy; are mutually accountable to each other; and invest in community-driven solutions. Furthermore, we contend that violence reduction leading to a basic level of safety is the first step toward community transformation resulting in better health, educational, and economic outcomes.

TEN-FIVE-THREE: THE CORE TENETS OF CVRS

10 ROOT CONDITIONS OF COMMUNITY-LEVEL VIOLENCE

1 LACK OF TARGETED SUPPRESSION THAT FollowS A COMMUNITY PolICING MODEL

2 LACK OF COMPREHENSIVE PRIMARY PREVENTION INFRASTRUCTURE

3 LACK OF COMMUNITY ECONOMIC INVESTMENT, WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, AND FAMILY ECONOMIC SUCCESS

4 LACK OF EFFECTIVE REENTRY STRATEGIES AND SUPPORT

5 EARLY ACADEMIC FAILURE AND LACK OF SCHOOL ATTACHMENT

6 FAMILY ISOLATION AND LACK OF ACCESS TO SUPPORT STRUCTURES

7 LACK OF COMMUNITY COHESION TO IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY

8 INADEQUATE GOVERNMENT COORDINATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

9 POOR ACCESS TO QUALITY HEALTH AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE SERVICES

10 NORMALIZATION OF VIOLENCE

All of the 19 communities in which Urban Peace has conducted a community violence assessment share 10 common root conditions that contribute to entrenched violence. These conditions manifest themselves differently in each community, reflecting the historical and cultural legacy of each neighborhood, as well as the specific way in which public policy and local practices have evolved.

Like other public health threats, violence is a symptom of many risk factors interacting at different levels; no single factor can put some individuals or communities at a higher risk than others.

Both risk and protective factors exist at four different levels within our social ecology: the individual, the relationship, the community, and the societal (see “Ecological Framework” on previous page). Within this ecological framework, preventing violent behavior or the likelihood of violent behavior is possible, but complex.

The public health approach to violence reduction addresses the unique conditions in a given community at the “root” of long-term neighborhood violence. Therefore, a public health approach rejects suppression-only strategies that fail to address the underlying community conditions spawning gangs and violence. This model also goes way beyond incremental, “one child at a time,” solutions to community violence. Instead, the public health model advocates for a wrap-around solution within each high violence community that is linked to a larger, regional strategy.

Some communities may have experienced rapid demographic shifts while others may have a highly transient population – both lead to isolated families. Some may have chronically under-performing schools while others may only have recently experienced a decline – both lead to lack of school attachment for at-risk youth. In short, despite the specifics, we have found that all communities with violence and gang entrenchment have some manifestation of these 10 root conditions.
FIVE KEY ELEMENTS

To combat the 10 root conditions fueling community violence, a sustainable violence reduction initiative must target five key service elements:

PREVENTION
INTERVENTION
SUPPRESSION
REENTRY

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES

While the first four elements are familiar from other models, Equitable Access is unique and simply means that the other four service elements are equally available to all individuals and communities at-risk of violence and that these services are culturally competent, meeting the true needs of diverse families. This is particularly important in places that have undergone rapid demographic shifts or where there are significant pockets of underserved and isolated segments of the community. As noted above, in Los Angeles, significant strides have also been made in defining the practice of these service elements through the work of GRYD, Urban Peace, and the Urban Peace Academy.

THREE GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Within the CVRS, solutions pursued under each element must adhere to three fundamental guiding principles:

COMMUNITY-BASED & CULTURALLY COMPETENT SERVICE DELIVERY

Any initiatives must be community based, honor the existing leadership and assets of the community, and must deliver culturally competent services.

DATA-DRIVEN POLICY MAKING

Initiatives must aim to improve the use of data and data-sharing protocols across various public and community based service providers leading to more effective and coordinated service delivery, as well as the ability to track what works.

BUILT-IN ACCOUNTABILITY

Any initiative must have built in accountability measures that ensure the initiative is regularly evaluated and effective. Both the public sector and the community must be held accountable.

Children enjoying lunch at the Annual Urban Peace Academy BBQ Celebration.
The chart below provides a comprehensive chart of the CVRS’s three guiding principles, five elements, and ten root community conditions of violence.

**URBAN PEACE GUIDING PRINCIPLES**

**COMMUNITY-BASED & CULTURALLY COMPETENT SERVICE DELIVERY**

**DATA-DRIVEN POLICY MAKING**

**BUILT-IN ACCOUNTABILITY**

**FIVE KEY ELEMENTS TO COMMUNITY VIOLENCE REDUCTION**

- Prevention
- Intervention
- Suppression
- Reentry
- Equitable Distribution Of Resources

**10 ROOT CONDITIONS OF COMMUNITY-LEVEL VIOLENCE**

- Lack of Targeted Suppression that Follows a Community Policing Model
- Lack of Comprehensive Primary Prevention Infrastructure
- Lack of Community Economic Investment, Workforce Development, and Family Economic Success
- Lack of Effective Reentry Strategies and Support
- Early Academic Failure and Lack of School Attachment
- Family Isolation and Lack of Access to Support Structures
- Lack of Community Cohesion to Improve Public Safety
- Inadequate Government Coordination and Accountability
- Poor Access to Quality Health and Mental Health Care Services
- Normalization of Violence

The question for violence entrenched communities is how the Ten-Five-Three come together into an actionable strategy capable of achieving immediate reductions in violence, but also sustaining a long-term basic level of safety. Through our practice of technical assistance and support of 19 communities, Urban Peace has developed concrete tools that operationalize the Ten-Five-Three. These tools help a community to identify its assets and needs, build a multi-sector stakeholder network for action, and develop the most feasible pathway for violence reduction tailored to that community. 

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There has been significant progress on many of the recommendations...we believe initial success must be deepened and sustained with greater investment and continued commitment.
PROGRESS AND CONTINUED CHALLENGES

A Call to Action made 106 recommendations for action. While there has been significant progress on many of them (61% of recommendations are completed or in progress), we believe this initial success must be deepened and sustained with greater investment and continued commitment. The recommendations not yet implemented must serve the blueprint for the next five years.

The recommendations covered the steps that the City should take toward developing an entrepreneurial department to lead a citywide, comprehensive violence reduction strategy, as well as how such a department should mobilize research, data, and community input to implement the different elements of such a strategy. The recommendations also touched on the key ways non-City entities, such as County agencies and schools, needed to be mobilized for a truly regional solution to gang violence that met the scale and scope of the problem. Of the 106 recommendations:

Nine were rendered moot by the City’s response to the report.

Among the remaining recommendations:

- 65 or 61% were either completed or are currently in progress.
- 41 or 39% have not been implemented.

Given the breadth of the recommendations and the complexity of implementing these recommendations in a place as vast, and diverse as Los Angeles, it is a tribute to the tremendous joint efforts that all parties have made.

“The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department worked closely with Connie Rice to implement various programs designed to reduce gang violence.”

Leroy D. Baca, Los Angeles County Sheriff

The vast majority of the recommendations completed or in progress relate to the establishment of the Mayor’s Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) and utilizing data-driven policy to concentrate the City’s resources in the highest need communities. In terms of the elements of a comprehensive violence reduction strategy, the City has made giant strides in all elements, although progress in the arenas of prevention and reentry lag behind suppression and intervention practices.

What follows is a detailed review of what recommendations have been acted upon and which await action in L.A. around the five elements of a comprehensive violence reduction strategy: prevention, intervention, reentry, suppression and equitable distribution of resources. Urban Peace’s work to ensure full adoption of the recommendations is included, and is designated by green text.

Young people in communities with high levels of violence are at risk of joining gangs.
The creation and maintenance of a robust primary prevention infrastructure in high violence communities is a critical element in eradicating root conditions of violence. A Call to Action outlined the need for comprehensive prevention efforts to buttress a citywide violence prevention strategy. Of the six prevention-related recommendations in the original A Call to Action, four have been implemented in part or in whole. While these recommendations have been addressed in some way, this implementation does not guarantee the sustainability of these practices. Such concerns must be addressed strategically for current and for any future violence prevention efforts. Nevertheless, groundbreaking citywide violence prevention policies have been established to reinforce what is outlined in A Call to Action, indicating critical steps toward a comprehensive strategy.
Over the last five years, Urban Peace has empowered communities to put the Comprehensive Violence Reduction Strategy (CVRS) into practice through our technical assistance to place-based initiatives. In these initiatives, Urban Peace employs principles of community mobilization to build broad-based engagement for community action.

In 2009, Urban Peace worked to establish a multi-sector stakeholder network known as the Belmont Neighborhood Violence Reduction Collaborative. Located within the Westlake/MacArthur Park neighborhood of Los Angeles, Belmont is a culturally diverse neighborhood plagued by violence due to the 27 different gangs within its boundaries. Urban Peace began its work in Belmont by recruiting multi-sector co-conveners – the “Core Partners.” These included Youth Policy Institute; the City’s Rampart GRYD office; World Vision, (a faith-based organization); and the UCLA School of Public Health, which administered the program’s evaluation component. The Core Partners, together with 25 collaborative agencies, came together to address the violence in their community. Urban Peace and co-conveners provided data that allowed the Collaborative to determine the scope of violence, work to enhance coordination between existing programs, and simultaneously identify and fill critical gaps in these services. Most importantly, the Collaborative empowered residents and students to advocate for safer schools, culturally competent services, and greater accountability from law enforcement and government.

Urban Peace continued to provide technical assistance to the Safe Successful Schools workgroup, a sub-group of the Collaborative, as it initiated a Safe Passages program for schools in the Belmont Zone of Choice. Our work on the Safe Passages initiative focused on mission alignment between various public sector, community service providers, and community residents in order to create real student safety in and around Belmont neighborhood schools.

Supporting Community Transformation

Place-Based Technical Assistance: Belmont Safe Passages

Advancement Project Co-Director, Connie Rice, delivering the key note speech at the First Annual L.A. Gang Violence Prevention and Intervention Conference.
A critical tool in building mission alignment has been the Urban Peace-engineered Guided Logic Model process. The Guided Logic Model process is designed to guide stakeholders and policy makers toward a shared, community-specific, public health understanding of violence reduction. Through this process, participants educate each other about the conditions that sustain violence in their community, while simultaneously moving toward a common, data-driven understanding of the community’s existing resources and needs. The Guided Logic Model outlines the specific relationships between the problems, solutions, and outcomes facing a particular community and empowers participants to implement informed strategies for sustainable violence reduction.

The chart below is a visual representation of the guided logic model process for a single root community condition of violence.

* The strategies, activities, measures, and outcomes for this sub-category are not outlined here. This is meant to demonstrate the exhaustiveness of only one sub-category, but not of the entire root condition.

** Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED).
Always looking forward, Urban Peace continues to expand its efforts in violence reduction in targeted areas throughout Los Angeles. For Urban Peace, the Watts area of South L.A. is one of those targeted communities. In a 10 year timeframe, the Latino population has grown tremendously in South L.A., tilting the demographics of the area and highlighting the need for culturally competent services that reflect such change. From 2000 to 2010, the Latino population has increased by approximately 35% in the Watts community overall. The African American population has witnessed negative growth, decreasing by 15%. Of the three major housing developments in Watts, all have seen at least a 60% Latino population increase in the past 10 years.

Recognizing this demographic shift, Urban Peace has begun work to bolster Latino leadership in Watts. Partnering with Watts Century Latino Organization, Urban Peace seeks to develop curriculum and leadership training to actively engage Latino residents, equipping them with the knowledge, confidence, and tools necessary for on-the-ground policy change. The emerging leaders will work with public sector entities and community based organizations to highlight the needs of the growing Latino community in Watts and advocate for culturally competent programs and services targeted to meet those needs.

### INCREASE IN LATINO POPULATION, DECREASE IN AFRICAN AMERICAN POPULATION

Data from U.S. Decennial Census (2000, 2010). Values for the housing developments and Watts were approximated using block group level data.

* Denotes public housing developments in the City of Los Angeles.
In L.A.’s hot zone communities, intimidation, gang recruitment, and violence often plague the streets that students traverse to and from to school. These factors deter attendance, resulting in truancy and school drop-out. Simultaneously, harsh school discipline policies and over-reliance on law enforcement disproportionately impact male students of color, discourage student success, and needlessly push youth into the juvenile justice system. The map below indicates the number of truancy tickets issued across L.A. GRYD zones and speaks to both the street safety and school policy challenges faced by youth in our hot zones.

Safe Passages work addresses these school-related safety issues. Schools are the hub of any community, making teachers and school staff critical partners in any violence reduction and community transformation initiative. Yet, the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Unified School District have not prioritized the creation of seamless prevention networks in each of our high-need community schools. Current Safe Passages programs are not applied uniformly and are often ad hoc in nature. This weak Safe Passages infrastructure leaves our students vulnerable.

An adequate education starts with a safe environment. Looking at key violence, school attendance, and community indicators, Urban Peace’s collaborative work on multiple Safe Passages projects strives to bring back the safety and support necessary for youth to achieve their educational potential.
A Call to Action was an early champion of the burgeoning field of gang intervention. Five years later, the City of Los Angeles has implemented almost all of the reports’ recommendations aimed at building and strengthening the intervention profession. Mayor Villaraigosa boldly embraced A Call to Action’s emphasis on intervention as a vital component of the City’s overall gang strategy in the GRYD zones. He increased the total amount of contract dollars for intervention services by allocating $500,000 of dedicated intervention funding per GRYD zone, and has sustained this level of funding despite the fiscal crisis. While current City funding is insufficient to support intervention work across all of Los Angeles’ gang-affected neighborhoods, the City funded intervention work is appropriately concentrated in the City’s 12 GRYD zones and four non-GRYD communities where the rate of gang-related violent crime is 400% higher than the rest of the City.

**INTERVENTION: AT-A-GLANCE**

**SUCCEEDS:**

- Significant City financial support for intervention services over the last five years
- Creation of 12 GRYD Zones
- Public sector support for the creation of the Urban Peace Academy
- Creation of the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA) operated by Urban Peace Academy

**CONTINUED CHALLENGES:**

- Continue/expand funding for intervention work within tightened public budgets to meet the scale and scope of the problem
- Maintaining the intervention movement’s momentum, developing a viable succession plan for veteran interventionists and ensuring new generations of intervention professionals

Mothers being recognized during the Women Intervention Workgroup 2nd Anniversary Celebration.
Growing up in Watts, Andre Christian has been no stranger to gangs. After spending his younger years heavily involved in the gang lifestyle— including being shot 13 times—something changed: “A light actually came on in my head. Before then, I wasn’t into change. I was stuck in the street life and street mentality. I wasn’t trying to make any kind of peace.”

In 1995 Andre began to work to create the exact peace he previously was destroying. He started to reach out to youth within his community to prevent gang violence before it happened— intervention work. Andre knew he could be particularly effective at reducing violence among youth because, as he says, “I was there before – where they at – so I have the tools to change their minds.”

When Andre started this work, he did not see the value of intervention training. “I thought I didn’t need training. How’s somebody going to tell me about gang banging when I am right here with it?” But as he continued with his efforts on the ground, he saw his work being limited. That is what brought Andre to a LAVITA training run by the Urban Peace Academy. “LAVITA opened so many light bulbs in my head – like a burst of sunlight. I had been holding myself back for a long time.”

After participating in this training, Andre now sees the real value in investing in, training, and professionalizing the field of intervention. He started seeing a change in how effective he was as a gang intervention worker, thinking to himself, “Dang, maybe this stuff is really needed!” Andre credits LAVITA for strengthening the depth and scope of his life-saving work.

Not only did the Urban Peace Academy change Andre’s work for the better, he’s seen the impact professionalized gang intervention has had in his community: “One of the best things that has happened [in our community], period. Making a big difference.”

To Andre, professionalized intervention is about “saving lives” and changing things for future generations so “kids can be kids again.”
THE URBAN PEACE ACADEMY

The nascent, yet effective, field of gang intervention needed to develop professional standards and regulations to become a powerful force against gang violence that could effectively partner with other violence reduction practitioners. Accordingly, the Urban Peace Academy has been central to the legitimization and successful expansion of gang intervention work in L.A. and beyond.

With strong support from both Mayor Villaraigosa and LAPD Chief Beck, the Urban Peace Academy was established in 2008 to increase ground-level interventionists’ ability to implement a comprehensive violence reduction strategy. By bringing together street-level, professional, and academic experts in a multi-disciplinary collaborative process, the Urban Peace Academy has transformed the field of gang intervention and established an intervention framework consistent with A Call to Action’s original recommendations.

The Academy has made great strides in professionalizing the field of intervention through:

• The development of minimum levels of qualifications and training requirements for gang intervention
• The creation of a tiered professional development track for gang intervention workers
• The establishment of standards of practice and conduct, rigorously enforced by a Professional Standards Committee

Importantly, the Academy has also developed parallel training for law enforcement on the basics of gang intervention, allowing for cross-training opportunities and development of best practices for collaboration with law enforcement.

To date, the Urban Peace Academy has trained over 1,200 gang intervention and community workers and over 400 law enforcement officers. This has created an authentic cadre of intervention workers engaged in positive partnerships with law enforcement, actively preventing gang violence and improving community safety.

LOS ANGELES VIOLENCE INTERVENTION TRAINING ACADEMY (LAVITA) IN GRYD ZONES

A total of 81 violence interventionists were certified through Urban Peace’s LAVITA. They are mapped and counted according to the GRYD zones (and Harbor area) they work in as of their certification date. The chart reflects the number of individuals certified and not the capacity of work done by individual intervention workers.
The strides made by the Urban Peace Academy have gone hand-in-hand with progressive intervention policies adopted by the City of Los Angeles in response to the original A Call to Action. The Academy was chosen by the City to operate the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA), the only training platform in the nation for gang intervention workers financed by a government entity. Academy-trained intervention workers staff each of the City’s GRYD zones and Summer Night Lights programs.

Because of L.A.’s intervention successes, communities across the nation are beginning to explore gang intervention as a component of their violence reduction strategies and are looking to L.A. – and the Urban Peace Academy in particular – for support. Urban Peace Academy instructors have been called to Sacramento, Long Beach and Columbus, Ohio, as well as internationally, to train not only gang intervention workers but also law enforcement and other violence prevention stakeholders.

To date, the Urban Peace Academy has trained over 1,200 gang intervention and community workers and over 400 law enforcement officers. On the ground this has meant a true force of intervention workers engaged in positive partnerships with law enforcement, actively preventing gang violence and improving community safety.

The Urban Peace Academy engages and trains community members, developing ground-level capacity to implement violence reduction strategies in their own neighborhoods.

The Urban Peace Academy organizing strategy deliberately engages former gang members and supports their transformation into peacemakers through training, leadership, and capacity-building opportunities.

An integral concept in the Urban Peace Academy’s organizing practices is the “license to operate.” License to Operate, or LTO, is a community organizing concept describing the legitimacy of an actor or organization as perceived by key stakeholders within the community. Former gang members have the actual street credibility to engage warring factions within L.A.’s hot zone communities and effectively de-escalate tensions because they can reach the right people through triangulation of their communication and relationship networks.

While base-building with former gang members can prove to be a challenge, Urban Peace Academy’s efforts to build and strengthen the profession of gang intervention have fortified L.A.’s ability to address violence from the ground-up with real time ability to impact violence dynamics at the neighborhood level.

Simultaneously, Urban Peace Academy’s training offers a legitimate career path to former gang members whose other employment options are severely limited. By leveraging both respect and authority arising from its track record, Urban Peace Academy has made strides in its community violence reduction goals and its larger efforts to affect community driven change.
THE FUTURE OF INTERVENTION

While the expansion and maturation of the gang intervention profession over the last five years has been remarkable, it is clear that continued investment is required to maintain the current positive momentum and overcome looming challenges. One challenge is a chronic lack of resources. Even as intervention has been recognized for contributing to the phenomenal reductions in violent crime within Los Angeles, and particularly reductions in retaliatory shootings (see “Decrease of Incidents with Shots Fired”, pg. 36), the threat of decreased funding for this crucial work remains real, particularly given the current budget cuts and possible shifts in priorities under a new mayoral administration.

While present limited intervention funding is being appropriately concentrated in areas exhibiting the highest levels of violence, there exist many other L.A. neighborhoods with violence that receive no intervention resources. These communities present a latent threat for a deadly resurgence in gang violence. Maintenance of current funding and resources is not sufficient. Even greater resources for intervention are needed to fully meet the scale and scope of the problem. Additional resources are critical to nurture a new generation of intervention professionals, to create a viable succession plan for existing veteran intervention professionals, and to ensure that the gains made over the last five years continue.

“WITH THIS TRAINING, I’VE BEEN GIVEN THE TOOLS TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE ON THE STREETS. I CAN HELP YOUTH THAT ARE IN NEED...MY JOB IS TO GO INTO THE STREETS, SCHOOLS, AND FAMILIES TO SHOW THEM HOW THEY CAN CHANGE THEIR LIVES.”

–GUILLERMO AGUILAR, LAVITA Graduate

Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa with Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy graduates.
DECREASE OF INCIDENTS WITH SHOTS FIRED IN LOS ANGELES, 2006 AND 2011

2006

Total Incidents with Shots Fired\(^a\)

3,288

In the year before A Call To Action: The Case for a Comprehensive Solution to Los Angeles Gang Violence Epidemic, there were 3,288 crime incidents with shots fired in the City of Los Angeles.

The 10 ZIP codes with the highest number of incidents with shots fired were concentrated primarily in the southern portion of the City and one ZIP code in the eastern portion of Los Angeles.

\(^a\) Crime incidents with shots fired reflect all incidents reported to the LAPD involving incidents outside Los Angeles City boundaries.

\(^b\) The number of crime incidents with shots fired per ZIP code reflects the incidents reported only to the LAPD. The actual number of the incidents may be higher for each ZIP code when including incidents reported by other agencies.

Geographic data from Esri, NAVTEQ, DeLorme, Census TIGER cartographic boundary files. Crime data from Los Angeles Police Department. Incidents with shots fired do not include reported incidents related to domestic violence, sex crimes, suicide, or child abuse.
The number of incidents with shots fired declined by 52.4% in 2011 compared to 2006.

The 10 ZIP codes with the highest number of incidents with shots fired also experienced a dramatic reduction in firearm incidents.

DROP IN TOP 10 ZIP CODES FOR NUMBER OF INCIDENTS WITH SHOTS FIRED

![Map showing ZIP codes with the most incidents with shots fired, 2011](image)

**Total Incidents with Shots Fired**

1,565

52.4% Compared to 2006

1,723

The 10 ZIP codes with the highest number of incidents with shots fired also experienced a dramatic reduction in firearm incidents.
The City of Los Angeles has enjoyed almost a decade of progressive law enforcement leadership, first with Chief William Bratton and now with Chief Charles Beck. Chief Bratton re-engineered the LAPD in many ways; he shifted the focus of the department by understanding that tension and distrust of the police are hindrances to reducing crime. New LAPD directives limiting the impoundment of cars driven by those without licenses (i.e. undocumented immigrants) and the curtailment of the use of truancy tickets against students on their way to school exemplify LAPD’s problem-solving approach to policing that looks beyond arrests to secure community safety.

As a result of A Call to Action, and the ensuing shift of public discourse around violence reduction efforts, both leaders publicly rejected the idea that crime and violence can be solved by law enforcement alone and have taken active steps towards building authentic partnerships with communities and with civic leaders to build public safety. These steps have included LAPD’s support of the Mayor’s GRYD strategy, including implementation of a formalized, three-way crisis response protocol between GRYD, LAPD, and gang intervention workers, and mandated training for gang officers on collaboration with gang intervention workers, as recommended in A Call to Action.
**HISTORIC CRIME REDUCTIONS**

These and other efforts have brought historic reductions in crime for the ninth consecutive year. Most dramatically, over the last five years since the release of the report, the City has experienced a 32.4% reduction in total gang-related incidents and a 52.4% reduction of total firearm related incidents (see maps pages 16 and 36). In addition, communities with GRYD zones have experienced a reduction in violent crime from 2007-2011 (see map page 13). Overall, L.A. continues to experience reductions in crime.

While progressive policies and crime reduction have had a positive shift in how communities, particularly communities of color, perceive LAPD, the long history of strained community-law enforcement relationships and the larger context of failed suppression-focused policies locally and nationally will require a sustained effort well beyond the initial steps taken in the past five years. Residents in gang-entrenched communities continue to raise alarms about over-broad suppression practices, such as gang injunctions, and their tendency to funnel too many youth into the criminal justice system.

In areas that have experienced rapid population shifts, a targeted and culturally competent effort is necessary to connect with the largely immigrant communities who are isolated and often more vulnerable to intimidation and harassment from gangs. Finally, one of the most important remaining challenges is sustaining and expanding some of the cultural shifts that have occurred in the LAPD over the past 10 years, and truly institutionalizing the problem-solving, community-oriented policing approach throughout the department.

Keeping these concerns in mind, the Urban Peace program has worked tirelessly over the last five years with many partners – one of the strongest partners being law enforcement themselves – to ensure community victories around police transformation. Most notably, the Law Enforcement Training through the Urban Peace Academy has been, and continues to be, a crucial tool for effective engagement with the gang intervention community. The Advanced Law Enforcement Training is a daylong training that educates peace officers about the field of gang intervention and provides strategies for collaboration that still maintain their mutually independent roles. Since 2009, over 400 law enforcement officers have received the training, including both LAPD and Los Angeles Sheriff Department, among them lieutenants, sergeants, detectives, deputies, and patrol officers.

**THE FUTURE OF SUPPRESSION: COMMUNITY SAFETY PARTNERSHIP**

With technical assistance from Urban Peace, the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA) and LAPD piloted the innovative Community Safety Partnership (CSP): a formal agreement to engage residents and promote safety at the Ramona Gardens, Nickerson Gardens, Jordan Downs, and Imperial Courts public housing developments.

CSP is unique for both HACLA and LAPD in its recognition that safety cannot be achieved through traditional policing, but instead requires collaboration among all stakeholders. The agreement mandates relationship-based policing that relies on long-term assignment of police personnel and data-driven community safety planning. LAPD has established a team of dedicated, full-time law enforcement officers at each project site who enforce a relationship-based policing model that engages stakeholders to increase overall “community livability.”

Through its ongoing technical assistance, Urban Peace ensures that:

1. Each project site maintains a Community Safety Partnership Team composed of community leaders, service providers, LAPD and HACLA representatives. The Team develops site-specific safety priorities and meets regularly to monitor progress and to solve problems.

2. CSP coordinates with local schools, community-based youth service agencies, and intervention agencies to secure safe routes to and from school, both during and after school activities.

3. CSP coordinates with parks and recreational facilities located within and near the housing developments to maintain safe public spaces for recreational and enrichment activities.

The Community Safety Partnership represents an exciting, groundbreaking approach to true community policing. Urban Peace will continue to provide technical assistance for the duration of this pilot program, gathering data and documenting best practices for possible replication and expansion in the future.
Melissa Pirraglio came to Los Angeles in 2002 to leave behind the gang life in San Diego. After arriving she found the same destructive forces persisted in two very different communities. This emboldened her to make it her mission to support those who wanted to leave the gang life.

Having received support herself from nonprofits who engage with at-risk teens, Melissa’s deep religious faith inspired her to begin doing gang intervention work “informally” by “trying to help people come out of the lifestyle [she] had come out of.”

As this informal intervention work picked-up, Melissa was referred to the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA). For Melissa LAVITA was a catalyst that allowed her to realize her natural capacity to reach people. “[LAVITA] definitely opened up my mind to the vast opportunity there is in regard to gang intervention. [Before LAVITA], I was so narrowly focused, it provoked me and put a lot of possibilities at my fingertips. It spurred a potential I didn’t even know I had.”

Newly empowered and inspired by her training with LAVITA, Melissa continued to expand her intervention work in the South Gate, Boyle Heights, Watts, and Lynwood communities. On the ground, she actively used the “tactics and mindset” she learned at the LAVITA training, in one case even preventing an imminent gang stabbing. She credits her success as an interventionist to an ability to walk a fine line: “As intervention workers, we have to be professionals, but we can’t lose our grounding in our relationships – so we have to have techniques to walk a path between those two worlds. I am able to do so because of the skills I learned at the Academy.”

“Coming out of the gang lifestyle, we understand how to leverage the respect hierarchy of the streets in our favor. At the same time, we need support and training and trust from the City. Loyalty is huge in the gang lifestyle, and that loyalty can translate into something positive – those of us who have gotten out wanting to see other people make it, come out and succeed.” Melissa sees herself and other interventionists as the critical “bridge” between gang members and the rest of society.

As a female intervention worker, Melissa has a particular focus in mentoring young women as they work to get themselves out of gangs. “Female on female intervention is challenging because young women are not trusting of other women, generally. In that lifestyle we tend to lose our femininity, because when you are in a gang you have to suppress so many emotions and conform to the homeboy image.” This is where Melissa has felt the greatest success as an interventionist: seeing the young women she mentors move away from gangs, building their self-esteem, and returning to school to build a career for themselves – what Melissa calls “concrete life changes.” With her life experiences and the training she received from LAVITA, Melissa continues to inspire and support “concrete life changes” for even more gang-involved youth.
While the City has made great strides in implementing recommendations related to gang intervention and suppression tactics, progress on recommendations related to reentry for both youth and adults has been slower. The City’s primary success related to reentry lies in its work toward a more community-based safety strategy, generally. Through increased funding to community-based service providers and greater investment in high violence communities where there is also a high concentration of reentering individuals, the City’s efforts to create stronger neighborhoods also lay a better foundation into which formerly incarcerated individuals can reintegrate.

While reentering individuals are tangentially receiving services as a result of the City’s larger neighborhood-based GRYD strategy, much more remains to be done in terms of the focus and scale of services and supports provided. Where the City has yet to take substantial action is around the creation of a “seamless transition” – true integration of services and supports available to people returning from a period of incarceration.

With the advent of criminal justice realignment through AB 109, the County of Los Angeles has been pushed to create a countywide plan for addressing the supervision and service needs of thousands of individuals returning to L.A. from the state’s prisons. While realignment officially shifts responsibility for a large segment of the reentering population to Los Angeles County, this shift also presents a unique opportunity for the City, should it choose to invest in and focus on the reentering population, to foster rehabilitation in order to prevent recidivism and facilitate a true reintegration of ex-offenders.

The County and the City of Los Angeles must work with myriad community-based service providers to coordinate and streamline service provision to those reentering. In addition to the housing, employment, physical, and mental health services these individuals will need, significant resources must also be invested in gang exit strategies and support for individuals making the transition out of gang life. L.A. can take cues from other cities that have established official City/County offices of reintegration services, providing a
means of coordinated service integration across municipal departments and agencies while funding targeted programming for the reentering population.\textsuperscript{30} It is only through such coordination and collaboration that the critical “seamless transition” can take place.

Beyond coordination of services, central to any reentry strategy is connecting those reentering to stable and sustaining employment. If L.A. is going to truly create a framework within which real reintegration is possible, we must create pathways to employment for those with criminal records. While the City and County alone cannot tackle all barriers to employment for formerly incarcerated persons, each entity can and must leverage its resources and contracting funds to create opportunities for, and eliminate barriers to, employment for this population. The City and County must examine and reevaluate their own criminal record restrictions on hiring, removing unnecessary prohibitions on civic employment, as well as consider the use of its contracting dollars as a mechanism to promote employment and skills training for those reintegrating.

Beyond adult reentry, A Call to Action also made recommendations specific to reentering youth. While small but significant steps have been made to provide wrap-around services to transitioning youth – for example, through the County’s Probation Youth Community Transition Project (PYCTP) – these limited pilot programs must be scaled up to provide comprehensive services and case management to all youth transitioning out of custody. Similar to reintegrating adults, juveniles attempting to reintegrate back into their families and communities, need strong, coordinated support services that begin prior to release and continue well past the first few weeks out. Unlike adults, reintegrating youth have the additional challenge of educational interruption caused by their time in the juvenile justice system. For these youth, school reintegration is a key piece of their “seamless transition” that is currently left largely unaddressed.

As the lead agency responsible for reintegrating youth, the County’s Probation Department must continue to make greater strides at improving its internal accountability structure, with a particular focus on data-driven reforms, while developing greater partnerships with community-based service providers to create an effective network of support for transitioning youth.

To this end, Urban Peace has undertaken the Juvenile Probation Data Project, a year-long, multi-disciplinary research study designed to produce a template of outcomes for youth success that can be tracked by Probation and other County departments. Utilizing Urban Peace’s inside-outside strategy, we have partnered directly with Probation, as well as a team of researchers from Cal State L.A., USC, and UCLA, and the Children’s Defense Fund to study how system-involved youth and their families fare before, during, and after their contact with Probation.

By better understanding the experience of youth in the juvenile justice system, the project will identify needed improvements in data collection and tracking, as well as opportunities for prevention, early intervention, and rehabilitation. The project will culminate in a set of findings and concrete recommendations that provide a clear blueprint to Probation on how to move forward. This will improve internal accountability and, ultimately, create better outcomes for our system-involved youth.
Crime rates in Los Angeles may be at historic lows, but 300,000 children still live in so-called “hot zones of gang violence,” according to a new report released Thursday by The Advancement Project and Violence Prevention Coalition, a nonprofit group that focuses on civil rights and public policy in Los Angeles. The new report breaks down the City by ZIP code and examines which neighborhoods are safest.

The report looks at gang crime, violent crime, child abuse rates, school test scores, middle school truancy, high school graduation rates, risk factors like families in poverty and “protective factors like the number of social service agencies working in an area.”

Susan Lee of The Advancement Project said this kind of ZIP code by ZIP code analysis is unprecedented.

“No report has done that small level of geographic analysis. L.A. is a city of hundreds of different communities and so we can’t have a cookie cutter approach,” she said.

Areas rated worst included parts of South L.A., particularly along the 110 corridor, areas in East L.A., and Pacoima.

90272 VS 90002

Pacific Palisades (90272) got all A’s while South L.A. (90002: bounded by Firestone Boulevard to the north, 107th Street to the south, Avalon Boulevard to the west, and Alameda Street to the east) got all F’s.

South L.A. had about 10 times the rate of violent crime and child abuse as Pacific Palisades. Middle school truancy rates: less than 1 percent v. 54 percent. Unemployment: 3 percent v. more than 15 percent. The nonprofit revenue of Youth Violence Prevention groups: $700 per capita v. $23.

Former LAPD Chief and now City Councilman Bernard Parks has long advocated for more than just improved policing to improve the lives of kids in these hot spot neighborhoods.

“What’s unfortunate is many of the things that were brought up after the Watts riot in ’65 – you can go through that report and find that many of those things were never corrected: employment, education, relationships with police, housing,” said Parks.

The 90017 zip code in the Pico Union neighborhood just west of downtown Los Angeles gives an example of the challenges. 27 different gangs operate in this neighborhood, including 18th Street, Mara Salvatrucha, Rockwood, Temple Street and Burlington Locos.

KPCC’s Frank Stoltze talked to two 12-year-old boys outside Leichty Middle School about how they stay safe and avoid gangs. One said, “I just go straight home and straight to the school so they cannot kill me or do something to me.”

The other middle schooler said, “I go directly to my house, and look in front and in back. Maybe they are going to try to shank you or something. Or jack you.”

One boy said he’s recently seen a man on the street who’d been stabbed. You generally don’t hear that in the Palisades, or Brentwood, or Sherman Oaks, or Granada Hills.

Susan Lee says, “If we have approximately 300,000 kids living in communities where violence is a daily reality, and these kids have everything from clinical depression to post traumatic stress disorder because of that violence, I think it behooves us to care about that and not be complacent because the crime rates are at a low.”

Lee is hoping the City and local residents will use the report to look at exactly what’s needed in specific areas.
In order to engage in an equitable distribution of resources, robust data must be employed to map and analyze current resource distribution as compared to community conditions. To meet this need Urban Peace, in collaboration with Healthy City and the Violence Prevention Coalition, created the Community Safety Scorecard: City of Los Angeles 2011 to measure safety, the quality of schools, risk factors – conditions on the ground that research has identified as increasing the risk of violence – and protective factors – those conditions that help to decrease levels of violence in a community – at the ZIP code level for the entire City of Los Angeles.

Ultimately, the Scorecard emphasizes the need to understand safety from a public health perspective and also reinforces the argument that public and private resources for violence reduction should be concentrated in areas where the data indicates the highest need.

Early wins have been visible right away. The Mayor’s decision to concentrate the City’s limited resources into the highest need communities represented a significant policy shift from prior initiatives where funding was usually spread across the City’s 15 council districts, irrespective of need. This shift has the potential for a ripple effect on how other types of public sector resources may be distributed in the future.

A Call to Action set the foundation for all of Urban Peace’s policy work. Inequity of resources in L.A. communities leads to the perpetual cycle of poverty, inequality, and violence, engulfing the most disenfranchised residents of our communities – people of color and youth. Urban Peace has addressed this gap by highlighting and uncovering inequity of resources through grounded, data-driven research and the use of Advancement Project’s HealthyCity.org data and mapping platform.

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The Scorecard powerfully revealed inequity in access to public safety in the City of Los Angeles, as demonstrated in the maps on page 45. These maps show that the least safe communities are not spread out across the City, but instead are geographically concentrated in the City’s southern and eastern regions.

The Scorecard further illustrated that a high number of risk factors, such as poverty and unemployment, were strongly correlated to a lack of protective factors, such as inadequate school conditions, and ultimately to low levels of safety. A closer look at these ZIP codes made clear that investments in a single community sector are not enough to raise outcomes in the rest of the sectors, which is consistent with the public health concept that one factor alone cannot sustain a community safety initiative.

Additionally, many of the ZIP codes graded “least safe” are positioned across multiple jurisdictions (e.g. cross-city areas, unincorporated county areas, or multiple City council districts), highlighting the need for a regional strategy in which both the City and County work to collectively raise outcomes in our communities.31
Community conditions can be measured by the interplay of risk factors and protective factors. These conditions inform the levels of community safety.

Communities with the highest risk factors and lowest protective factors have the highest concentrations of crime, as shown in each map as score rankings.

All sectors in a community have to work together to eliminate the conditions that sustain violence.
Blanca is in the 7th grade. She is a gifted science student who hopes to become a doctor or researcher one day. Blanca lives in Belmont in the heart of Los Angeles’ urban core. She has loving parents who believe in the promise of America for their children. Their home is small, but warm, with an emphasis on living a good life.

As soon as she steps out the front door, things change. Blanca’s neighborhood is considered the territory of 27 warring gangs.

On her block, there have been drug and gang-related shootings. Families struggle with poverty and inadequate housing. There is a 62% drop-out rate. Many of her neighbors battle serious health issues, and most are uninsured. Many of the young people in gang hot zones suffer from PTSD symptoms at rates higher than soldiers returning from Iraq.

Blanca’s short walk to Liechty Middle School is fraught with peril. She has to cross the 5th most dangerous pedestrian intersection in the country. She is confronted by gang members who actively “enforce” their territory by harassing and intimidating students who try to cross the many invisible gang lines in the neighborhood.

As Blanca looks ahead to high school, the picture becomes even bleaker. A high school with a cutting-edge science and math curriculum is only six blocks away. But it lies in the territory of one gang at war with the gang that control Blanca’s block. The school she needs to pursue her dreams might as well be on Mars.

Until now. The work that Urban Peace and their partners have done in Belmont through the building of the Belmont Neighborhood Violence Reduction Collaborative and the launch of the School Safe Passages program will not only help Blanca, but all of her peers. The School Safe Passages program in Belmont, and in other communities, brings together parents, teachers, police, local businesses, gang interventionists, and the public sector, to collectively work toward student safety to and from school. These programs ensure that youth in all of our communities are free to learn and thrive.
Protective factors are conditions on the ground that contribute to successful and healthy environments and that can help to mitigate violence. School conditions, risk factors, and protective factors are all interrelated factors which jointly inform the level of violence in a community. An imbalance between too many risk factors and too few protective factors can be a cause of unhealthy behavior of youth and adults in the community.

Correspondingly, the map above indicates that communities with some of the highest concentration of crime (e.g. south part of Los Angeles) have the lowest concentration of protective factors. The chart indicates that the top 10 ZIP codes with the most protective factors are ranked high in all other scores whereas the 10 ZIP codes with the fewest protective factors are ranked low in all other scores. This demonstrates that the resources and infrastructure for violence prevention are not distributed to the areas of highest needs.
After identifying areas of highest need, it is critical to dive deeper into each individual community and understand its assets, gaps, and crime and gang dynamics in order to implement a successful community-based violence prevention strategy. Toward this goal, Urban Peace has developed a robust protocol for Comprehensive Community Needs Assessments. Urban Peace needs assessments combine statistical data analysis and community-engaged research to understand and outline the conditions at the root of violence in an area. Needs assessments emphasize a ground-level approach that engages residents and community leaders to contribute their expertise, experience and concerns about violence reduction.

In addition to creating a single, consensus picture about the state of violence, Urban Peace needs assessments include a detailed set of specific policy recommendations for each site. All policy mandates and program endorsements are derived directly from the multiple sources of data involved in the assessment, including community-based resident knowledge and service provider input. Similar to the Assessments, the recommendations are intended for use by all stakeholders, including government agencies, community-based organizations, and resident leadership. Within the recommendations, emphasis is placed on strengthening violence reduction solutions that are already underway, or in new initiatives with a higher probability of success due to greater resource alignment.

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**NEEDS ASSESSMENT HIGHLIGHTS**

The Urban Peace team has conducted 19 field-based community needs assessments throughout California, including comprehensive assessments in six of the City of Los Angeles’ original 12 Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) zones and four assessments of Los Angeles County violence reduction demonstration sites.

- **In 2008, Urban Peace is awarded the City contract to conduct community needs assessment for six of the Mayor’s Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) zone assessments.**

- **In 2009, the L.A. County Regional Gang Violence Taskforce selected Urban Peace, in partnership with Cal State Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, to conduct assessments of the four county demonstration sites. Urban Peace expanded its methodology to include public sector engagement strategies, in-depth analysis of capacity gaps and demographic segments, and community history research. The comprehensive nature of the assessments allowed for detailed policy recommendations, comprehensive technical assistance, and support for communities addressing violence at much lower levels than typical L.A. City hot-zones.**

- **In 2010, based on its previous assessments for GRYD, the Housing Authority for the County of Los Angeles (HACLA) selected Urban Peace to conduct a community violence needs assessment of the Jordan Downs public housing development. The assessment helped catalyze the expansion of GRYD services in Watts. These findings also helped propel HACLA and LAPD to jointly initiate the Community Safety Partnership (CSP) program, an effort to bring 45 LAPD officers into the three housing developments in Watts and one in Ramona Gardens. Urban Peace partnered closely with LAPD, HACLA and other partners to conduct needs assessments in each of the four housing developments. These assessments informed the design of the CSP program and its officer training.**

- **Urban Peace has worked with funding partners such as The California Endowment, the Jewish Community Foundation of Los Angeles, and the Center for Disease Control to develop further research and technical assistance tools in support of a public health approach to comprehensive gang and violence reduction. Through these collaborations, Urban Peace has provided technical assistance to over 30 site-based networks and organizations supporting violence reduction efforts across the nation.**
THE FUTURE OF EQUITABLE ACCESS

While inroads have been made in terms of a more equitable approach to resource allocation, meeting the scale and scope of the need in all of Los Angeles’ communities still needs work. Given the current fiscal crisis, an intentional commitment to long-term funding solutions is necessary. One possibility is the creation of a dedicated stream of public funds for violence prevention and youth development.

A restoration and expansion of community-tailored services that addresses the entire spectrum of prevention, intervention, reentry, community capacity development, and neighborhood investment is needed. It is only after we have created a truly equitable baseline of resources that high impact violence reduction efforts can be sustained.

All sectors must be coordinated to serve the needs of youth.
The hard-won reforms within LAPD are beginning to create real community trust, bringing crime rates down and making officers safer in the streets. There’s more to be done, and the next mayor must support LAPD’s continued transformation under its current leadership.
EXPANDING L.A.’S COMMITMENT TO COMMUNITY SAFETY

STRENGTHENING AND EXPANDING THE L.A. MODEL

Despite the national trend of declining crime over the last 22 years, in the summer of 2012, Chicago suffered a 37% increase in homicides, a city in New Jersey came close to declaring a state of emergency after experiencing a dramatic increase in crime, and Houston, New York, and other major cities also experienced dramatic increases in violent crime. Los Angeles City, by contrast, has benefited from a steady decline in gang homicides, assaults, and other serious crime. Even in the context of national and California-wide general crime reductions, the City of Los Angeles’ crime declines are significantly steeper and reflect serious reductions in the toughest category – gang crime. While many meta factors contribute to this trend, part of this success is undoubtedly due to the City’s violence and trauma reduction strategy spurred by A Call to Action.

Central to Los Angeles’ effective violence reduction model has been the sustained leadership from the Mayor, the City Council, the Controller and the Chief of Police. While there were differences on issues of implementation, by and large the political will generated behind A Call to Action was sustained for the last five years, preserving funding, allowing experimentation, and jointly overcoming critical challenges.

As the mayoral election looms in 2013, a key question facing the City is whether the new mayor will prioritize the mission of violence reduction by continuing to support and nurture factors key to success. For example, it is critical that the trajectory for problem-solving policing initiated under former Chief Bratton and led by Chief Beck continue. The hard-won reforms within LAPD are beginning to create real community trust, bringing crime rates down and making officers safer in the streets. There’s more to be done, and the next mayor must support LAPD’s continued transformation under its current leadership.

Equally important, the Mayor’s Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) and its many innovations must remain within the mayor’s purview and have expanded resources. The new mayor will have to visibly demonstrate his/her backing for a comprehensive public safety approach, garnering strategic partners from the private and the public sectors. Beyond maintaining the GRYD office, the next mayor will also have to make GRYD a permanent institution, adequately resourced and with the political strength to tackle community conditions requiring longer-term investment. To effectively address these root conditions, GRYD must become an independent entity pulling from both public and private resources, insulated from the election cycle, and exclusively focused on its violence reduction mission.

Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy graduates showcasing their certificates.
While the City of Los Angeles has begun to address the visible symptoms of its gang violence epidemic, the struggle must be expanded and deepened, tackling root conditions of violence through coordination and cooperation with the County of Los Angeles and beyond.

Advancement Project’s Urban Peace program advocates for the leadership of the City and County of Los Angeles to publicly commit to achieving the following goals:

**GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY:** Government at every level must be held accountable for the basic safety of every child. This means addressing the root conditions of violence in our hot zones. Simultaneously, as a community everyone must reject violence and lawlessness in all of Los Angeles’ neighborhoods.

**SCALING UP PREVENTION, INTERVENTION, AND TARGETED SUPPRESSION:** The City and County of Los Angeles must bring up to scale prevention and intervention efforts to meet the need in the hot zones in a culturally competent way. The City must continue to implement strategic suppression that builds trust and partnerships with community members, and the County and other independent law enforcement agencies must work to adopt these principles.

**ACHIEVE FEAR-FREE SCHOOLS:** Beyond Safe Passages to and from school, all students should attend public schools free of bullying, gang intimidation, and all forms of fear. Consistent with A Call to Action, schools in gang zone neighborhoods must become wrap-around centers of opportunity and community vitality by engaging across sectors and coordinating with GYRD, community groups, and law enforcement.

**REGIONALLY COORDINATED COUNTY AGENCIES:** The County operates key agencies that have enormous impact on gang areas. It is unacceptable for the County to continue avoiding coordination with more successful City approaches to violence reduction and gang intervention; County agencies must cooperate with each other and with the City to achieve reductions in violence, trauma, and crime.

**BUILD A REENTRY NETWORK:** Los Angeles County must seize realignment as an opportunity to make coordinated, seamless reintegration a reality for its citizens returning from incarceration. By ensuring effective reentry service coordination and support, the County will prevent recidivism, reinforce reductions in crime, and continue to make all of its residents safer.

**EQUITABLE COMMUNITY BUILDING:** Gang-afflicted areas require investment in people, infrastructure and schools. We must begin by making schools the centers of communities, generating human and intellectual capital. These neighborhoods must receive the same capital, business, educational, and infrastructure investment from which affluent Los Angeles already benefits.

**CREATE VIABLE EMPLOYMENT:** As A Call to Action documented, the only proven means for permanently reducing gang violence is viable employment. There needs to be an immediate economic and employment plan for the hot zone communities of Los Angeles. Investment in meaningful career training and placement, along with support services necessary to keep and maintain employment, must be scaled up to meet the needs of all residents. In other words, Father Greg Boyle of Homeboy Industries has it right: “Nothing stops a bullet like job.”
Ultimately, ending the public safety inequity that plagues Los Angeles’ “invisible” communities will require long-term solutions that provide every youth in our violent hot zones a real alternative to gang membership. These solutions demand the political will necessary to pull together a truly comprehensive solution with real government-community partnerships at both the City and County level, tailored to yield and sustain results for each individual neighborhood.

Achieving community safety is more than ending or reducing violence. Violence and trauma reduction are only the first steps in the transformation of hot zones into livable, safe neighborhoods. True community safety is more than the absence of crime; it is a sustainable peace that allows every community member the opportunity for spiritual, physical, material, and psychological well-being. For all of the progress achieved thus far, we know that too many of our communities still have not achieved this safety threshold. It is up to all of us to build on and expand the efforts of the last five years to achieve true community transformation.

LAPD Chief Charles Beck reading to elementary school-aged children.
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<th>ZIP Codes</th>
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GLOSSARY

**Action plan** A written document that expresses the goals of an initiative or effort; the required activities and assigned timelines; responsible parties; and the desired outcomes.

**At-risk** The high possibility that an individual or family will suffer a harmful event associated with violent/aggressive behavior, including gang-involved or system-involved individuals.

**Asset-based** A strategy that recognizes and mobilizes individual and community talents, skills and assets, and promotes community-driven development rather than externally-driven development.

**Base-building** The creation and maintenance of a network of support and collaboration between and within critical community actors.

**Case management** Proper assessment of a client’s strengths, weaknesses, and needs; identification of goals; coordination of services from other providers; provision of service referrals as needed; and diligent monitoring of progress towards these ends.

**Community policing model** An untraditional policing model that emphasizes input from community members and stakeholders in police decision-making, strategies, and actions. Successful community policing is based on partnerships between police, community members, and local institutions to proactively address issues of crime, social disorder, or any other issues that community members choose to prioritize.

**Community Safety Scorecard** A ZIP code level analysis of Los Angeles’ communities that measure risk factors, protective factors, school conditions and community violence. The Scorecard functions as a tool for a more meaningful assessment of public safety beyond traditional crime statistics.

**Comprehensive transition planning** An effective transition plan for reentering individuals that includes pre-release planning, housing assistance, individualized linkages to local community resources, coordination of transition plans with local schools, and continuity of medical and mental health care.

**Comprehensive Violence Reduction Strategy (CVRS)** A comprehensive public health model for violence reduction that rejects a suppression-only strategy and an incremental approach to gang violence. Instead, the CVRS calls for a wrap-around solution that deals with the root causes of community violence specific to a given hot-zone community.

**Gang intervention (community-based)** Efforts to reach out to, connect with, and serve youth and adults who claim gang membership, have close friendships/association with current or former gang members, and/or have family members (especially parents/guardians or siblings) who are current or former gang members. Hardcore intervention mainly focuses on street mediations, crisis intervention, rumor control, and peace agreements. Key to an interventionist’s effectiveness is his/her “license to operate”, or street credibility within a given community.

**Gang entrenchment** The experience of a community or area suffering from high levels of violence and the dominant presence of gangs. Such areas are further characterized by a large community segments lacking access to necessary resources and services, and often are areas where past efforts for sustained violence reduction have failed.

**Hot zones** See Violence hot zones.

**License to Operate (LTO)** A community organizing concept encapsulating the perceived legitimacy of a given actor within a particular community. LTO is critical to the effectiveness of gang intervention work.

**Logic model** An organized structure for identifying and gaining consensus as to the root conditions of community violence problem and desired programming outcomes. The Logic Model is also used to evaluate program effectiveness. Many other technical assistance tools are imbedded within the Logic Model process.
Mission alignment The process of moving two or more sectors toward a consensus about each of their complementary missions. The goal of mission alignment is greater effectiveness for each of the involved sectors.

Multi-sector Descriptive of a process or body inclusive of multiple sectors, including private and public, such as schools, business, philanthropy, governmental agencies, law enforcement, faith-based organizations, and neighborhood associations.

Normalization of violence A state of perceiving violence as a normal, everyday occurrence often occurring in communities with systemic, entrenched, multigenerational violence. This state is exacerbated by a lack of positive role models, hyper-violent media messaging, and a generalized sense of despair and helplessness about violence, which prevent community members, especially multi-generational gang involved families, from seeing violence as treatable.

Place-based initiatives An initiative focused on a particular, geographic location identifiable as a discrete community, where a range of targeted strategies and assets are applied or coordinated in order to achieve better community outcomes.

Public sector Elected or governmental agencies, e.g. law enforcement, school districts, fire departments, libraries, and offices of elected officials.

Safe Passages A school-focused program that engages parents, students, teachers, gang intervention workers, the public sector, and the business community to ensure students can walk to school and back home safely, without experiencing fear and harassment. Safe Passages efforts can include community members escorting students and patrolling routes to schools, working to create efficient bus routes, and increasing law enforcement patrol before and after school hours.

Triangulation A communication method allowing a third party to facilitate conversation between two antagonistic groups by listening to the concerns of each group individually and then sharing appropriate messages and core concerns across groups.

Violence hot zones Communities with particularly high levels of gang and community violence, particularly as compared to surrounding neighborhoods.
1. The report was commissioned in 2005 by the City of Los Angeles Ad-Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development (Chairs, Councilmembers Martin Ludlow and Tony Cardenas).

2. The co-authors included Father Greg Boyle, Homeboy and Homegirl Industries; Gila Bronner, The Bronner Group; Maria Casillas, Families in Schools; Way-Ting Chen and Jennifer Li Shen, Blue Garnet Associates; Patti Giggans and Cathy Friedman, Peace Over Violence; Megan Golden and Jena Siegel, Vera Institute of Justice; Peter Greenwood, Ph.D.; Jorja Leap, Ph.D.; David Marquez, JDHM Consultants; Bill Martinez, MCRP; Cheryl Maxson, Ph.D.; Ali Modarres, Ph.D, The Pat Brown Institute, CSULA; Sgt. Wes McBride; Cecilia Sandoval, The Sandoval Group; Howard Uller; Billie Weiss, MPH, Southern California Injury Prevention Research Institute, UCLA.


5. Many of the bolded terms in this report that require an extended definition are defined in the Glossary, page 54.

6. Please refer to page 19 to read more about the Los Angeles Comprehensive Violence Reduction Strategy. To learn more about other models please refer to their corresponding websites.

7. See page 21 for the 10 root conditions of violence the Urban Peace team identified through extensive research and engagement in L.A. hot zone communities.

8. For more information on Advancement Project’s Urban Peace work and successes please see our website at: < http://v3.advancementprojectca.org/?q=ap-ca-urban-peace >

9. The GRYD office, under the leadership of Deputy Mayor Guillermo Cespedes, developed an original, family centered conceptual model of gang violence reduction which informs all of its programs and practices. The model is described and explained in The City of Los Angeles Mayor’s Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development Comprehensive Strategy, Guillermo Cespedes and Denise Herz (December 2011).

10. Description of Summer Night Lights from the Mayor’s website: “SNL is an anti-gang initiative that keeps parks open after dark—during the peak hours of gang activity—with free food and expanded programming.” For more information please visit: < http://mayor.lacity.org/issues/gangreduction/summernightlights/index.htm >

11. Based on 2011 data.

12. Crime decrease for all GRYD zones communities has been calculated by the GRYD office with 2011 and 2007 LAPD crime data.

13. For violence reduction levels in the City’s SNL parks in comparison to non-SNL sites, please see page 14.


17. The data in the maps of this report are from City of Los Angeles crime data, Los Angeles Police Department (LPAD): LAPD provided reported crime records for the years 2006 through 2011 with some exceptions due to data sharing restrictions for certain types of crime incidents. Actual announced crime statistics from LAPD can be different from those in this report. They are mostly higher than what this report shows due to the data sharing restriction. Healthy City aggregated records to block group and ZIP code level data. Values for each ZIP code indicate only the values within the boundary of the City. Excluded crime codes from our analysis include: suicide, domestic violence, child abuse, rape, illegal sexual activities, etc. In addition, please review the ZIP codes and corresponding neighborhood boundaries used in this analysis by referring to page 52 map titled, “Neighborhood Boundaries and ZIP codes in Los Angeles.”

19. The California Cities Gang Prevention Network, the National Forum on Youth Violence, and the Urban Networks To Increase Thriving Youth (UNITY) are statewide and national networks of cities experimenting with the implementation of a comprehensive strategy.

20. Distinct from the Boston Operation Ceasefire, the Boston Foundation began the StreetSafe Initiative in 2008 bringing together community based and faith based organizations and city agencies to deploy two main strategies in the violence impacted neighborhoods. The strategies include use of street level gang intervention and neighborhood based service delivery. For more information, see: <www.streetsafeboston.org>

21. For more information on the Urban Peace Academy, please see page 33.

22. See sections on “Comprehensive Community Needs Assessments: Research as an Action Tool” and “Communicating the Public Health Approach to Violence Reduction: Guided Logic Model” for more information about our tools. In addition, for a particular example of the Ten-Five-Three in action please see the section on “Place-Based Technical Assistance: Belmont/Safe Passages” on pages 47, 28, and 27 correspondingly.

23. It is important to note that some of the recommendations that still need to be completed require robust partnership with Los Angeles County and the Los Angeles Unified School District. Violence and gangs know no jurisdictional boundaries and thus a region-wide strategy is needed to effectively and sustainably reduce crime levels and improve community outcomes.


25. The Safe Successful School Workgroup is one of the three workgroups that self-identified from the logic model process at the Belmont Violence Reduction Collaborative.

26. The Safe Passages is one of several strategies that the workgroup identified as a necessary project that required the collaboration of all the entities that made up the workgroup.

27. Common practice has it that there is one school in a particular geographical area where all students of the neighborhood attend. In a Zone of Choice a family may have different campuses to choose from (Belmont Zone) and/or have several choices amongst small schools within the same campus, this allows students the opportunity to choose the school that best fits their academic needs and interests. See more information here: <http://ld4-lausd-ca.schoolloop.com/bz>


30. Examples of integrated offices for reentry related services include the District of Columbia’s Office of Returning Citizens’ Affairs <orca.dc.gov> and Philadelphia’s Mayor’s Office of Reintegration Services for Ex-Offenders (R.I.S.E.) <phila.gov/reentry>

31. The Community Safety Scorecard, City of Los Angeles, 2011 is available as a PDF here: <http://v3.advancementprojectca.org/?q=Scorecard>

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Thank You to Urban Peace Funders
The Annenberg Foundation
The Bank of America Charitable Foundation
The California Community Foundation
The California Endowment
The California Wellness Foundation

The Jewish Community Foundation
The Ralph M. Parsons Foundation
The Rose Hills Foundation
The Weingart Foundation
The W.M. Keck Foundation

Design
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